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Abstract
This paper uses an in-depth case study of Turkey to exam-
ine the complex and contemporary challenges facing the
. The work of the  Turkey Program presents a
unique example of the problematic relationship between a
nation-state and an international refugee regime. The
Turkish government ratified the  Convention relating to
the Status of Refugees in March , but maintains the
geographical limitation restricting its asylum commitment
to applicants from European countries. Turkey, one of only
two countries among the signatories of the Convention that
keeps the geographical limitation, relies mostly on the
’s eligibility assessment of non-European asylum-
seekers. Although the focus of the paper is a country-specific
example, its goal is to establish a model that can be used in
evaluating any  regional or country program.
Résumé
Cet article tente d’examiner les défis complexes contempo-
rains confrontant le  par le biais d’une étude en profon-
deur de la Turquie. Le programme du  pour la Turquie
est un exemple unique de la relation problématique pou-
vant exister entre un état-nation et un régime international
sur le droit d’asile. Le gouvernement de la Turquie a ratifié
en mars  la Convention des Nations Unies de 
relative au statut des réfugiés, mais continue à maintenir
les restrictions géographiques, limitant ses engagements
envers seulement les demandeurs provenant de pays
européens. La Turquie est l’un des deux seuls pays parmi les
signataires de la convention à maintenir une restriction
géographique. Pour ce faire, il s’appuie principalement sur
la notion de test d’admissibilité de demandeurs d’asile non-
européens. Quoique que l’article porte sur l’exemple d’un
pays spécifique, son but ultime est d’établir un modèle
pouvant servir à l’évaluation de n’importe quel programme
du  dévoué à une région ou à un pays.
Introduction
The establishment of the United Nations High Com-missioner for Refugees () in  createda new stage for a more institutionalized and inter-
national refugee regime. Until that time, it was presumed
that individuals must belong to a state to ensure their pro-
tection and give that state responsibility for (or control
over) them. Refugees, on the other hand, were stateless
people, so they were a predicament, for they denied and
challenged the protection and accountability of their own
countries.
With the  Convention and the  Protocol, the
 created an international norm and law establish-
ing the right for an accepted “refugee” to have international
protection. As the main international institution dealing
with refugees, the  began to implement several so-
lutions: voluntary repatriation, integration into the coun-
try of first asylum, and the resettlement into a third coun-
try of asylum to ease the refugee burden. However, within
a complex system for dealing with refugee plight, where
refugees are outcomes of a political decision taken by a
nation-state, but solutions to their well-being expand be-
yond that nation-state, the  continues to face new
challenges and complications.
In the last two decades of the twentieth century, the glo-
balization of capitalist economy has deepened the economic
gap between the wealthy North and the poor South. The
rapid increase in the number of the states with diverse re-
gimes and global communication and transportation sys-
tems, ongoing ethnic wars, the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, and the institutional growth of the European Un-
ion further complicated the refugee issue. “Over-
foreignerization” of Europe has created greater discrimi-
nation, racism, xenophobia, and the resurgence of cultural-
specificity claims and restrictive cultural identities. The
growth of Islam as a European religion and the increased




their own culture threatened. Today Europe maintains more
rigid limitations along its borders. As a result,  per cent
of the world’s refugees flee one poor country for another.
As former  High Commissioner Sadako Ogata ob-
serves, “[I]t was in Europe that institution of refugee pro-
tection was born, it is in Europe today the adequacy of the
system is being tested.”  Within such an era the 
Turkey branch presents a unique example of the contem-
porary problematic relationship between a nation-state and
an international refugee regime.
This paper evaluates the work of the  through
the country-specific example of Turkey. The Turkish gov-
ernment ratified the  Convention relating to the Status
of Refugees in March , but maintains the geographical
limitation restricting its asylum commitment to applicants
from European countries. Turkey, one of only two coun-
tries among the signatories of the Convention that keeps
the geographical limitation, relies mostly on the ’s
eligibility assessment of non-European asylum-seekers.
Non-European refugees are granted temporary asylum in
Turkey following a status-determination procedure in
which the  Branch Office—opened in Ankara in
—plays a key role. Nearly all these refugees need to be
resettled through the .
This paper, however, uses a country-specific example to
examine the complex and contemporary challenges facing
the  today, and performs a three-level analysis that
can form the basis for an evaluation model for any regional/
country program. This analytical approach categorizes the
challenges of the  in three broad areas: external, in-
ternal, and collaborative challenges.
 and Its Contemporary Challenges in a
Country Program
Since this paper concerns itself with a country-specific ex-
amination of the organization, the focus will be on these
challenges through the lens of the Turkey Country Pro-
gram. As a consequence of Turkey’s application for geo-
graphical limitation, the ’s biggest responsibility in
Turkey is the assessment of eligibility of non-European
asylum-seekers. This responsibility comes with other con-
siderations, including protection of non-European refu-
gees and asylum-seekers by ensuring access to fair and effi-
cient refugee-status determination procedures, and by pro-
viding assistance pending resettlement or lasting solutions.
However, the main challenges should be evaluated within
a broader perspective. To analytically examine these chal-
lenges, the study is categorized into external, internal, and
collaborative challenges.
External Challenges
In the  system, which is founded in the idea of nation-
states, the concept of refugee is still closely tied to the un-
derstanding of state sovereignty, national security, and
membership, making the topic of refugees complex. As
Arthur Helton argues, the contemporary refugee dilemma
is, as the  or regional organizations extend treaty pro-
tection and strengthen enforcement mechanisms, that gov-
ernments can still reduce the protection. The impact of
donor politics on  practices, the political and eco-
nomical importance of the country within the  system,
and the human rights record of the country in which the
 operates, create a real challenge.
In international relations literature there are four broad
areas that affect a country’s refugee policies: bureaucratic
choices, international affairs, the national security consid-
erations of the host country, and the absorption capacity
of the local host community. In this study, these areas are
accepted as external challenges to the ’s activities.
The nation-state uses its own authority in deciding
which bureaucratic mechanism to use when dealing with
refugee issues. In cases where states allocate responsibility
to a civilian state agency, such as the Ministry of the Inte-
rior or a social welfare agency, it is usually an indication
that refugee policies are determined by the high politics of
the country. Most of the time, in states that handle refugee
issues as a part of their high politics, the military becomes
involved in decision making. Military involvement in refu-
gee issues demonstrates clear concern for national secu-
rity, in which case the national authorities see the refugee
cause as an extra burden and are reluctant to consider the
welfare of refugees. However, if a refugee agency is in charge
of refugee issues, as is the case in most Western countries,
then refugee policies are a part of low politics of the coun-
try. In this case, the refugee policies of states tend to be
more liberal and open.
The international affairs of the country are crucial to
the determination of its bureaucratic choices. International
assistance, a negative international reputation, and public-
ity may influence a state’s bureaucratic choice on refugee
policies. However, a host community’s perceptions of in-
ternational organizations can also play an important part
in decision making. The level of politics at which refugee
issues are decided may affect local attitudes towards inter-
national assistance and cooperation. Nation-states are very
sensitive to issues directly related to their national sover-
eignty. As Jacobsen observes, “[by] demonstrating that bor-
ders cannot be controlled, a mass influx challenges and
undermines the government’s sovereign right to determine
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who enters its territory.” Government dependency on in-
ternational assistance during a mass influx may lead to the
idea that with this assistance other entities may find a right
to intervene in the state’s domestic affairs and that idea may
cause resentment toward the international community.
 Local absorption capacity relies primarily on economic
self-sufficiency and social receptivity. Social receptivity is
largely determined by the cultural meaning of refugees,
which is influenced by cultural, historical, and religious
factors. When refugees are thought to cause social prob-
lems, public sympathy dies.
Threat to security is another external challenge. The
conventional understanding of national security is based
on the concept of external or internal military threat. The
revisionist view departs from the militaristic conception
of its inclusion in wide-ranging issues like the environment
and economic factors. The third conception of security is
a combination of these two: it perceives security as an ex-
ternal problem of wide scope as well as internal threats to
its unity and integration. Refugees threaten all three di-
mensions of security.
Within this perspective this paper tries to understand
how Turkey’s multiple roles challenge ’s activities.
Turkey as a Country Producing Refugees and
Internally Displaced People
Turkey has been one of the most common countries of
origin among asylum seekers in Europe, especially since
the s. The first wave of Turkish asylum seekers to Eu-
rope came immediately after the military coup in  and
was followed by the escalating Turkish-Kurdish conflict in
. The numbers of asylum applications reached approxi-
mately , Turkish nationals, mostly of Kurdish ori-
gin, between  and . By some accounts, today Tur-
key has the second-largest population of internally dis-
placed persons in the world. Since fighting between Kurdish
pkk and the Turkish army began in , an estimated
, lives have been lost, and forcible evacuations led to
the destruction of nearly , Kurdish villages. During
most of the s and s, the government imposed a
state of emergency on eleven provinces in the southeast.
Conflict and fear created a larger migration. In July ,
Turkey’s deputy prime minister announced that ,
people had been forced to migrate during thirteen years of
conflict. In , Turkey’s Minister of Human Rights said
that  million people were without houses or a place to call
home. The U.S. Department of State’s  Human Rights
Report cited an estimated , people as internally dis-
placed.  The scope of action of security forces in south-
east Turkey has included armed forays into Iraqi territory,
which has negatively affected the living conditions of Iraqi
Kurds.
Turkey as a Transit Country
The open-border policy within the European Union (eu)
increased the importance of border-control policies for the
peripheral states. On several occasions, Turkish authori-
ties expressed their irritation at becoming a transit coun-
try as well as being a buffer zone between the East and the
West. In many cases, Turkish authorities harshly criticized
the Western countries for taking the most qualified or de-
sirable refugees and leaving the rest to find their own way.
The eu countries, on the other hand, criticized Turkey for
not protecting its borders strictly enough against the traf-
ficking of people. When over , persons arrived on the
southeastern coast of Italy in , Turkey as a transit coun-
try became an issue again. The majority of people arriving
in Italy consisted of ethnic Kurds from Turkey and Iraq, as
well as Egyptians, Bangladeshis, Sri Lankans, and Algeri-
ans.
While Turkish authorities announced that they would
not be surprised by pkk involvement in trafficking, a state
secretary in the German Interior Ministry, Eduard Linter,
stated that there was suspicion that Turkey was not doing
as much as it could to stop the Kurds leaving the country,
probably because of the dispute between Ankara and the
eu over Turkey’s application for membership in the eu. He
added, “It is hard to imagine Turkish security forces would
not have noticed ships of this size.”
In February ,  people of Kurdish descent were
left on the shores of France. According to a New York Times
report, the trafficking involved some Turkish nationals. This
last development once more indicated the critical position
of Turkey as a transit country.
Turkey as a Country of Asylum
In the past eleven years, there have been several large-scale
influxes of refugees and persons in refugee-like situations:
Iranians in the early s after the Islamic Revolution,
Afghans in , Iraqi Kurds in  and , Bulgarian
Turks in , Bosnians in , and Kosovars in . The
estimated numbers of refugees are high: Nearly  million
Iranians, about , Iraqi Kurds in  and half a mil-
lion in , almost , Bulgarian Turks, ,
Bosnians, and , Kosovars found asylum in Turkey in
little more than a decade.
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Why Are Turkey’s Multiple Roles Crucial to 
Activities?
Turkey’s multiple roles in the refugee issue affect its refu-
gee policies dramatically. In the last two decades, the emer-
gence of Kurdish nationalism and the rise of Islam chal-
lenged the cultural homogeneity of Turkish society. On that
account, national security became an internal and external
problem for the state. Any refugee coming from Iran, Iraq,
or Syria approached Turkey with skepticism. Influenced
by their ethnic and religious background and by terrorism
in the region, Turks saw Middle Eastern refugees as a secu-
rity threat to Turkey’s unity. Since the  was in charge
of refugees from these countries,  and Turkish offi-
cials clashed over this issue. In the last decade, Turkish refu-
gee policies focused increasingly upon security as a result
of high involvement by the Ministry of the Interior and
the Defence Ministry in refugee issues. During the four-
teen years of conflict with the pkk, Turkish authorities pro-
moted the slogan “Love or Leave Turkey” to contend with
rebellious Kurds, and public sympathy for the Kurdish cause
diminished. In the international arena, Turkey denied that
internally displaced people were a problem, and the Turk-
ish public as well as authorities began to denounce as be-
trayers any refugees who wished to resettle in another coun-
try. ’s assistance to Iraqi Kurds was not well appre-
ciated by Turkish society. Furthermore, high inflation and
economic instability wore down the Turkish people, and
the public came to believe that Turkey had insufficient re-
sources to deal with refugees.
In its international relations Turkey always followed the
“be the Western ally” model, its active involvement in 
and the  a direct outcome of this foreign policy. How-
ever, the ’s constant rejection of Turkey disillusioned the
Turkish public. In the last ten years Turkey became a near-
pariah state, because it was more concerned about its na-
tional security, more sensitive about intervention in its
national sovereignty, and more skeptical about interna-
tional humanitarian and human rights organizations. The
more the West criticized Turkey’s low profile on human
rights, the more Turkey became negative about the s
and international organizations and started to perceive their
assistance as an international intervention in its national
sovereignty.
Within such a climate, the ’s role was extremely
sensitive, and Turkey’s bureaucratic choices and interna-
tional affairs, as well as the absorption capacity of the local
community, created a direct challenge to the .
Internal Challenges
Financial and human capital management are two impor-
tant internal challenges that affect the ’s activities
and efficacy. In the Turkey Country Program, most refu-
gees and many asylum-seekers rely on ’s limited re-
sources for material support, which takes the form of a
monthly stipend, food, shelter, basic health care, and school-
ing, as well as legal and social counselling. Travel costs are
also paid for refugees invited to Ankara for refugee-status
determination and resettlement interviews.
In the   Global Appeal, the  Turkey
Office listed the number of non-European refugees and asy-
lum seekers of concern as ,. In addition,  Bosnian
and Kosovar refugees and , Turkish returnees were pro-
vided with  assistance. The total financial cost is
announced as . million dollars. In , the 
Global Report working budget for the  Turkey Of-
fice was ,, and income from contributions was
 million. Given the number of refugees and the finan-
cial constraints of the  system, monetary issues became
a challenge for the . While continuing to provide
assistance,  had to become involved in a constant
search for funding.
Human capital management is a challenge in itself.
’s expanding program to train government decision-
makers and maintain public awareness requires an inter-
nal training program. Advocacy groups have raised several
concerns about ’s procedures and staff in Turkey.
One of the biggest criticisms facing the  Ankara
Office is the lack of standardized selection criteria for the
eligibility interview. Although this would appear to be
largely an institutional problem, it is actually a matter of
internal staff training. The Ankara Office has also been criti-
cized for the interpreters it used during the interviews. As
a result, during the past three years,  Ankara moved
away from the ad hoc use of interpreters and started em-
ploying full-time, trained interpreters. The absence of con-
sistent gender-sensitive standards was identified as one
major gap in the asylum system throughout the region. Sub-
regional workshops on raising gender awareness started to
be organized. Training of the national staff on cultural sen-
sitivity and the need to leave personal beliefs and
understandings outside the interview room, however, still
remain challenges for the .
A very substantial increase in asylum applications in the
last decade has led to a backlog in applications. The result
is that asylum seekers and  staff have become frus-
trated and/or overworked. The  regulation identified the
Ministry of the Interior (in collaboration with the )
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as the final decision-making body for status determina-
tion, and therefore required that the national staff be in
constant communication with the Turkish authorities. High
stress and frustration reduced staff empathy for asylum-
seekers and refugees, or caused it to vanish entirely. The
 Ankara Office is, however, very open to changes
and learns a lot from different experiences, which is the
biggest strength of the country program.
Field Study Notes
The basement of the  Ankara Office, where the asylum
seekers are interviewed, is cold, dark, and depressing. Chil-
dren whose parents are going through the process are hun-
gry, crying, and bored. The frustration of mothers is reflected
on the kids. No one really talks in the room, but there is an
incredible noise in the air. On the fourth floor of the same
building, the national staff of the  are wrestling with
difficulties that the Turkish authorities give to the asylum seek-
ers in the satellite cities and at the borders. On the third floor,
the staff are worn out about the resettlement processes that
last for years . . . On the street across from the  build-
ing, children, women, and men are sitting in the dirt for days
waiting for their claim to be heard.
A Canadian woman of Iranian descent who was also an
asylum seeker ten years ago arrived as an intern to the 
Ankara Office, to the place where she was granted refugee sta-
tus. She was a Ph.D. student in Canada, working on game
therapy for children. After her first week in the Office, she
suggested she establish a playground in the basement for chil-
dren. After her third week, she exhibited the pictures that chil-
dren drew while they were waiting for their parents, on the
third floor. She gave the children a “word” and wanted them
to draw a picture of that word. The answers with crayons were
very impressive. Happiness was black because the children did
not know what it was, fear was the picture of the father, and
sadness was a friend who was left back at home . . . That was
the first time I felt that an actual bond was built between all
the floors of the  Ankara Office.
Collaborative Challenges
In order to discover durable solutions, a variety of inter-
mediary operating organizations, governments and the
 must cooperate. This challenge has become more
complicated since disseminating information about refu-
gees, advising decision-making authorities, and taking a
part in the determination of refugee status became a part
of the ’s responsibility. Support for the ’s
mandate from the political leadership, the higher levels of
administration, and influential s, as well as the public
at large, is crucial for the adoption of policies and the suc-
cess of its programs.
This paper distinguishes two different collaborative chal-
lenges that are crucial to the Turkey Country Program:
collaboration with the resettlement countries, and collabo-
ration with the national s and implementing partners.
Since all non-European refugees must be resettled in a
third country, collaboration with the resettlement coun-
tries is critical. The resettlement process take from six
months to two years. This not only increases the financial
strain on the country program but also creates psychologi-
cal frustration for refugees. Once refugees are granted sta-
tus, they must reside in the satellite cities determined by
the Turkish government, where they are obliged to have
signature duty. Children are not allowed to attend Turk-
ish schools during this period. Any kind of schooling is
not permitted in the satellite cities.
A shortened waiting period is the ideal solution for the
’s problem. However, some resettling countries have
a longer screening period for refugees from the Middle East.
Resettlement countries might look at four criteria when
determining acceptance of a refugee: whether the refugee’s
educational and professional background will make inte-
gration into the society possible, whether health is good or
poor, whether the refugee’s security screening is clear, and
whether the refugee has a military background. However,
besides being questionable on humanitarian grounds, these
criteria can make the whole process longer than expected.
By keeping foreign embassies in Ankara updated about the
conditions of refugees in Turkey, the Office tries to estab-
lish more collaborative relationships with the resettlement
countries.
 Cooperation with implementing partners in Turkey is
also critical to the success of the . The  works
with seven implementing partners: Anatolian Development
Foundation, Argen Company, Association for Solidarity
with Asylum-seekers and Migrants, Human Resource De-
velopment Foundation, International Catholic Migration
Commission, and Turkish Red Crescent Society. To help
serve non-European refugees, new partnerships were forged
with s. With the collaboration of its partners, 
conducted research on the problems of refugees in Turkey,
and led public information campaigns on community serv-
ices. One great strength of the  Turkey Program is its
collaborative relationship with its implementing partners.
 in Turkey
Turkey experienced the first mass influx of non-conventional
refugees in , when the Iraqi Kurds were attacked by the
Iraqi government with chemical weapons. Thousands of
civilian Kurds poured into Turkey in a matter of days. The
Turkish government was initially against the idea of granting
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asylum to the Kurdish refugees. Many Turkish parliamen-
tarians stated that it was ironic to accept thousands of
Kurdish refugees while a conflict was going on with Kurdish
guerrillas in southeastern Turkey. However, the next day
the Turkish prime minister announced that the humani-
tarian dimension of the problem necessitated opening the
borders.  Because it was the first of its kind, this mass in-
flux was full of ambiguities for the Turkish government.
Some officials believed that under international law Tur-
key had no obligations to these refugees, while others were
hesitant to employ the term refugee for this group of peo-
ple. It was decided to call these people “temporary guests”
or “Pershmergas” (members of an Iraqi Kurdish sect). For
the  Ankara Office, an influx of this scale was also
new. Turkish authorities feared that the intervention of the
 might prevent voluntary repatriation or cause new
waves of migration, so they refused to allow the  to
extend its assistance and protection.
 From  to , Europe was reluctant to accept
Kurdish refugees from the camps on the Turkish border
with Iraq, yet at the same time criticized Turkish officials
for not providing adequate assistance. This tension led to a
tug of war between the Turkish government and the West.
Turkish officials refused to accept us million for pro-
viding better shelter and health conditions for the refu-
gees, arguing that the aid was an attempt by Western offi-
cials to keep refugees in Turkey rather than repatriate
them.  Friction only increased while the situation remained
unsolved. Meanwhile, Turkey faced another influx of ,
refugees after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Then in , hun-
dreds of Bosnians sought asylum in Turkey. Turkish offi-
cials requested that the  assist Bosnians who had
sought temporary haven in Turkey. A camp was established
near Kirklareli, and the  provided housing units and
cash for other essential supplies and infrastructure. Today
the  still continues to address the needs of the
Bosnian population in Kirklareli and has started new
projects to assist vulnerable Bosnian families—including
households headed by women—children, and the elderly
living outside the camp, mainly in Istanbul.
After the Gulf crisis (–), there were new develop-
ments in Turkish governmental practice towards “non-
Convention” refugees. With the establishment of a safe zone
in northern Iraq, Turkey became more reluctant to accept
asylum seekers. The result was even more friction between
Turkey and the , especially over asylum seekers who
had been recognized as bona fide refugees as a result of
human rights violations in Turkey itself. For example, when
thousands of Turkish Kurds—mostly from Sirnak—fled
Turkey in April  as fighting erupted between Turkish
forces and the pkk in southeast Turkey, the  assisted
, persons in towns and villages along the Iraqi side of
the border. In July and August , a second flow of refu-
gees from villages in Hakkari arrived in northern Iraq. By
the end of August, more than , people had settled
across the border. However, the continuing conflict at the
border put refugees at risk, and Turkish authorities denied
permission for some s to operate in the area. The
 transferred , people to two sites in Atroush and
established a sub-office in Dohuk to co-ordinate assistance
in Atroush. While armed conflicts between the kdp
(Kurdistan Democratic Party) and the puk (Patriotic Un-
ion of Kurdistan) intensified, between March and May 
Turkish military operations scattered pkk elements through-
out the Dohuk governorates. Turkish authorities insisted
that a quick solution must be found for the Atroush camp,
because they were convinced that the camp was a base for
pkk terrorists. Ignoring Turkey’s accusations, the 
increased its presence in the area, although monitoring
during the evenings became impossible for security reasons.
In October , representatives of the kdp, puk,
Turkoman Front, Turkey, U.K., and the U.S. met in Ankara
to discuss settlement of the conflict in northern Iraq. Arti-
cle  of the final statement of the meeting stated that the
participants agreed to work with and support the 
for the immediate voluntary repatriation of Turkish citi-
zens in the Atroush camp. On December , , the
 turned the camp over to the local authorities.
An official who did not want his name to be revealed
stated during an interview that the , other interna-
tional organizations, and s failed to understand the
critical position of the Turkish government. Because of its
logistical importance, Turkey had to be very careful, espe-
cially about humanitarian aid sent to the region. He stated
that Turkish authorities found military equipment in boxes
of humanitarian aid, highlighting the skepticism of Turk-
ish authorities who feared that some international organi-
zations and s were supporting terrorism in the area.
He was emphatic that terrorism, trafficking in drugs and
people, and the possibility that an Islamic regime might be
transferred to Turkey from Iran were threats to the integ-
rity of the country, and any support for these conditions
was unacceptable to Turkey.
With the Gulf War, the ’s activities in Turkey ex-
panded considerably; it opened sub-branches in Istanbul,
Silopi, and Van. With a total of  international,  junior
professional, and  national staff, it became the largest
country program in the .
In , when , Kosovar refugees found asylum in
Turkey under the joint ⁄ Humanitarian Evacua-
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tion Program, the  Ankara office and the Turkish
government were more experienced with mass numbers
of refugees. The Turkish government covered all the care
and needs of the Kosovar refugees during their stay, and
the  assisted in family reunification and monitored
voluntary repatriation to Kosovo.
The 1994 Regulation
Exhausted from mass influxes, Turkish authorities intro-
duced their own status determination in July . Their
regulation—entitled The Regulation on the Procedures and
the Principles Related to Mass Influx and the Foreigners
Arriving in Turkey either as Individuals or in Groups Wish-
ing to Seek Asylum either from Turkey or Requesting Resi-
dence Permits with the Intention of Seeking Asylum from
a Third Country—identified the Ministry of the Interior
as the final decision-making body for status determina-
tion, in collaboration with the . The regulation also
stated that once a decision was made, the foreigners were
entitled to live in a specific provincial city where they were
responsible for signature duty.
Article  of the regulation stated that individual foreign-
ers entering the country legally were required to apply
within five days to the local governorate, and if they en-
tered illegally, they were required to register with the
governorate within five days, in the city where they entered
the country. Article , which set out the decision-making
procedure for the Interior Ministry, made no reference to
appeals or to the review of negative decisions. Article 
stated, “Without prejudice to Turkey’s obligations under
international law and considering the geographical char-
acteristic of a mass influx, it is essential to stop such a move-
ment and the advance of asylum seekers at the borders.
The authorities in charge shall take necessary and effective
measures to do so.”  Article  identified the responsible
bodies in the event of a mass influx:
In order to administer any possible mass influx near our bor-
ders and to organize the co-operation, a Minister of State or
the Ministry of Interior as appointed by the Prime Minister
shall be in-charge. Representatives of the Turkish General Staff,
the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Interior,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the
Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Communications, the
Ministry of Agriculture and Village Affairs, other ministries
and organizations concerned along with the National Intelli-
gence Services and Turkish Red Crescent Society shall form a
provisionary main coordination committee. The secretarial
duties of this committee shall be performed by the ministry
in charge.
Article  also permitted the deportation of refugees and
asylum-seekers legally residing in Turkey, for reasons of
national security and public order.
 Although the  considered the regulation a ma-
jor development in Turkey’s refugee policy, it did raise some
concerns. As a result of the five-day limit in the asylum
application, there were a number of refoulement cases. De-
portation of refugees and asylum-seekers legally residing
in Turkey for reasons of national security and public order
caused alarm for the  because martial law was al-
ready in force in the southeastern part of the country.
Furthermore, the  had no official role in the inter-
nal appeal procedure, and was informed about the list of
rejected claimants.
Interference with their sovereign right to deport people,
as Kirisci notes,  created considerable resentment among
the Turkish authorities, and led them to accuse the outside
world of interfering in Turkey’s domestic affairs. The 
regulation was a means to protect the state as an absolute
decision-maker on its borders and refugee policies. For that
reason, it was a challenge for  to convince Turkish
authorities to soften their implementation of the regula-
tion and to be more cooperative.
Conclusion
In the last decade, the  has played a constructive role
in the creation of Turkish refugee policy. By increasing its
sub-branches around the country, it has not only played
an important part in ensuring access to fair and efficient
status determination for non-European refugees, but also
promoted public awareness about the issues pertaining to
them. On several occasions,  advocated reform when
international standards were not being met. For example,
Turkey’s implementation of the  regulations led to an
increase in the number of refoulements.  responded
by preparing a report that explained the flaws in the regu-
lation and their consequences for Turkey’s compliance with
international obligations. In June ,  formally
presented this assessment to the government. Since then,
 Ankara has regularly engaged in dialogue with Turk-
ish authorities in order to improve procedures. As a result,
at least in part, no refoulement of recognized refugees was
recorded after this date.
An important amendment to the  asylum regula-
tion extended from five to ten days the deadline for appli-
cation following entry into the country. This greatly re-
duced the number of extra-procedural refugees.
Closer cooperation with the government in training ac-
tivities also increased government confidence in the fairness
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and impartiality of ’s advice. Furthermore, during
two major earthquakes that caused enormous casualties
and material loss, the  provided emergency relief to
earthquake victims and gained the respect of the Turkish
public. In the context of Turkey’s candidacy for member-
ship in the European Union,  helps Turkey to up-
hold the best international practice for the protection of
refugees. As a candidate Turkey is also expected to have
produced a National Plan of Action for Adoption of the eu
Acquis (npaaa) asylum standards.  will seek close
coordination and compatibility between its own program
and the npaaa.
By covering the administrative costs of its implement-
ing partners in Turkey, the  created a well-built civil
society that keeps promoting the rights of refugees and asy-
lum seekers. It also provides an intellectual forum for refu-
gee issues. By organizing seminars, exhibitions of photo-
graphs, and television programs to improve public aware-
ness aimed at the Ministry of Justice, police, judges, uni-
versities, s, bar associations, and civil society, the 
managed to form a more receptive and well-informed pub-
lic opinion. In the   Global Appeal,  An-
kara stated that its main goal was to persuade and assist
the government to create a specialized Office for refugee
status determination. The creation of this specialized Of-
fice would also be necessary in the context of an eventual
transfer of responsibility for refugee status determination
for non-Europeans from  to the state.
A review of the last ten years of the refugee situation
and the improvements in refugee law in Turkey reveals that
the ’s constructive and flexible approach serves as a
success story. The  Turkey Office realized the reali-
ties and the challenges in its program, and, instead of try-
ing to implement a rigid line to refugee issues, adopted a
more flexible approach that included cultural and social
aspects.  analyzed Turkish culture and politics well,
and managed to transform some challenges into its
strengths.
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